Expanding the Protectional Scope of Title VII “Because of Sex” to Include Discrimination Based on Sexuality and Sexual Orientation by Keaney, Colleen C.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 51 
Number 2 From Risk to Ruin: Shifting the Cost 
of Health Care to Consumers (Winter 2007) 
Article 16 
3-22-2007 
Expanding the Protectional Scope of Title VII “Because of Sex” to 
Include Discrimination Based on Sexuality and Sexual Orientation 
Colleen C. Keaney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Colleen C. Keaney, Expanding the Protectional Scope of Title VII “Because of Sex” to Include 
Discrimination Based on Sexuality and Sexual Orientation, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. (2007). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol51/iss2/16 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
581 
EXPANDING THE PROTECTIONAL SCOPE OF TITLE VII 
“BECAUSE OF SEX” TO INCLUDE DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
SEXUALITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[i]t shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”1  Although Title VII explicitly lays out these five protected categories, 
it does not explicitly define what “sex” entails, nor does it mention sexuality or 
sexual orientation as a protected class. 
Additionally, there is very little legislative history on the “because of sex” 
clause,2 allowing for more controversy and confusion over what was intended 
to be protected.  The amendment adding the word “sex” as a protected 
category of the Civil Rights Act was adopted—with little debate and no prior 
hearings—one day before the House passed the Act.3  Historically, it was 
believed that the main reason for this “sex” amendment was to provide equal 
opportunities for women.4  To date, no bill has been introduced on the federal 
level to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity.5 
However, in recent years, some case law has provided for a controversial 
expansion of the protectional scope of Title VII to include those discriminated 
against based on their sexuality,6 but not yet on sexual orientation.7  While the 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 2. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 3. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual 
Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1975); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 
(5th Cir. 1971). 
 4. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 
(9th Cir. 1971); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386. 
 5. Courtney Joslin, The 1964 Civil Rights Act Forty Years and Counting: Protection for 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Employees Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
HUM. RTS., Summer 2004, at 14, 14. 
 6. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).  “Sexuality” is used here 
to include those with differing sexual identities, such as transgendered and transsexual 
individuals. 
 7. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem,8 has recently interpreted the 
protectional scope of Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins9 to include 
people discriminated against for not conforming to sex stereotypes, other 
courts disagree.10 
The extension of the precedent set forth in Price Waterhouse that the 
“because of sex” clause includes those discriminated against for not 
conforming to gender stereotypes was correctly applied in the Sixth Circuit’s 
application of this principle in Smith v. City of Salem and Barnes v. City of 
Cincinnati to include transgendered and transsexual individuals.  Additionally, 
under the same gender stereotyping rationale set forth in Price Waterhouse and 
subsequently utilized in the Sixth Circuit, homosexuals, in addition to 
transgendered and transsexual plaintiffs, should and most likely will be 
protected under Title VII despite some courts’ reluctance to extend to them the 
protection that they would otherwise be afforded had they not been a member 
of one of these gender non-conforming “groups.”  Efforts to differentiate 
gender stereotyping from heterosexual norms have proven to be confusing and 
lacking in logic, as the two ideas are not distinct, but rather, are intertwined. 
This Comment begins with a brief description of what it means to be a 
transgendered or transsexual individual (Part I), followed by an overview of 
the history of case law relating to transsexuals and transgendered individuals 
bringing claims under Title VII, up to and including the 1989 Supreme Court 
decision in Price Waterhouse11 (Part II).  Next, this Comment covers the case 
law after Price Waterhouse regarding transgendered and transsexual plaintiffs 
(Part III), including the ground-breaking case of Smith v. City of Salem which 
afforded protection to a transgendered plaintiff (Part IV) and the one case to 
have emerged in the courts since the Smith decision (Part V).  Following the 
discussion of relevant case law pertaining to transgendered and transsexual 
plaintiffs is a discussion of the history of case law unanimously refusing to 
extend protection to homosexuals (Part VI).  Finally, there is a discussion of 
the anticipated further expansion of Title VII and the consequential important 
implications for employers in their hiring practices (Part VII).  The Comment 
concludes with a critical analysis of the courts’ reasoning of what the “because 
of sex” clause entails and who it includes (Part VIII). 
 
 8. Smith, 378 F.3d 566. 
 9. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 10. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget 
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616DS, 2005 
WL 1505610 (D. Utah June 24, 2005). 
 11. Price Waterhouse, however, did not deal with a transgendered, transsexual, or 
homosexual plaintiff. 
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I.  THE MEANING OF “TRANSGENDERISM” AND “TRANSSEXUALITY” 
Historically, courts typically assumed that gender should be defined in 
strictly biological terms.12  Legal definitions of sex discrimination were far 
removed from the idea of gender—the social construction of sex.13  The 
biological model of gender is rooted in the belief that gender is naturally 
determined and is unalterable.14  It assumes that “all bodies fit into one of two 
biological categories—male and female—and that the social and cultural 
attributes associated with gender are the natural result of a person’s biological 
sex.”15  Much of the early case law utilizing this biological model of gender 
was in the context of employment discrimination.16  In the 1970s and 1980s, it 
was clear in the case law that Title VII’s sex discrimination protection only 
pertained to biological sex, and not to “gender presentation or identity.”17 
These strictly biological definitions have allowed for a lot of uncertainty as 
to those who do not fit biological or social norms, such as transgendered and 
transsexual people.  A transgendered person is one who “appear[s] as, wish[es] 
to be considered as, or ha[s] undergone surgery to become a member of the 
opposite sex.”18  In other words, transgenderism is generally used to describe 
people who live as the opposite gender in appearance and behavior, but who 
may not have had their bodies surgically altered to match their gender 
identity.19  Conversely, a transsexual is “one who has undergone a sex 
change.”20 
In sum, both transgender and transsexual people portray themselves as the 
opposite sex.  The difference between the two classifications is whether or not 
they undergo hormone therapy and/or alter their sexual organs.  Transgendered 
individuals merely may dress as the opposite sex, whereas transsexuals are 
those who take hormones and/or undergo an operation to change their sexual 
organs.  These unusual concepts have uprooted our legal system’s assumptions 
of the direct connection between biological sex and gender and, consequently, 
 
 12. Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of 
Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 719 (2005). 
 13. Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-Gender Behavior, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 277 (Winter 2005). 
 14. Romeo, supra note 12, at 719. 
 15. Id.  (“[T]he model assumes that all people are either biologically male, and therefore 
present a masculine gender identity, or biologically female, and therefore present a feminine 
gender identity.”). 
 16. Id. at 720. 
 17. Id. at 719–20.  (“Under this model, people who do not fit clearly into this dimorphic 
system are considered to be either unnatural or deceptive as to their true nature.  As such, gender 
nonconformity has been held to be unworthy of legal protection.”). 
 18. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1833 (4th ed. 2000). 
 19. See id. 
 20. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1835 (4th ed. 2000). 
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have challenged our legal system and our conceptual idea of what type of 
discrimination is protected under the Civil Rights Act. 
II.  HISTORICAL CASES INVOLVING TRANSGENDERED/TRANSSEXUAL 
PLAINTIFFS 
For years, transsexuals were unable to bring employment discrimination 
claims under federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sex or disability.21  Disability has never been an avenue of protection for 
transgendered or transsexual individuals because the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), specifically states that it does not protect 
transsexuality or other gender identity disorders.22  Historically, the “because 
of sex” clause under Title VII has not been a successful avenue for them 
either.23  Much of the original denial of such claims may have revolved around 
notions that these types of people are social deviants who chose their “gender,” 
thereby refusing to accept their biological sex.24  However, recent judicial and 
legislative developments have granted greater recognition to transsexuals 
claiming discrimination or retaliation. 
In Holloway v. Arthur Anderson, the Ninth Circuit formulated the 
definition of “sex” in Title VII as only “the traditional definition based on 
anatomical differences.”25  Ramona Holloway, a transsexual, was employed by 
 
 21. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1017 (1984); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000).  As noted by Abigail Lloyd: 
At the federal level both “transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not resulting 
from physical impairments” are explicitly excluded from protection under the Federal 
Rehabilitation Act (FRA) and from the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  The 
language of the federal exclusions eliminates the possibility of protection for transgender 
people under federal disability laws.  The federal statutes place transsexualism, gender 
identity disorders, pyromania, and pedophilia in the same subsection of exclusions thus 
relegating people with gender differences to the equivalent of some of society’s most 
abhorred members—child molestors and arsonists. 
Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgendered People Strangers to the Law?, 20 
BERK. J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 150, 182 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 23. Romeo, supra note 12, at 721. 
 24. Id. at 719–21. 
As a general rule, Title VII protects characteristics that courts consider to be inherent or 
immutable.  By framing gender noncomformity as a matter of choice, courts were able to 
characterize the discrimination suffered by transgender plaintiffs as an adverse 
consequence of a decision that they had made, thus removing the discriminatory acts from 
the purview of Title VII.  In other words, courts characterized the expression of 
transgressive gender identities as something that the plaintiffs did, rather than as 
legitimate expressions of who they were, without any critical consideration of the 
performative nature of all gender or the societal enforcement of gender norms. 
Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted). 
 25. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. 
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Arthur Anderson in 1969 and was known as Robert Holloway.26  In 1974, 
Holloway was promoted and, at that time, informed his supervisor that he was 
receiving female hormone treatments and was preparing for anatomical sex 
surgery.27  A few months later, Holloway’s employment at Arthur Anderson 
was terminated.28  After exhausting administrative remedies, Holloway filed 
suit against his employer, alleging that he was fired because of his 
transsexuality, which violated Title VII under the “because of sex” clause.29 
The sole issue the court dealt with involved whether or not an employee 
may be discharged, consistent with Title VII, for initiating the process of sex 
transformation.30  Holloway contended that “sex” as used in the Civil Rights 
Act is synonymous with “gender,” and that gender would encompass 
transsexuals.31  Conversely, Holloway’s employer argued that the term “sex” 
should be limited to a traditional definition based solely on anatomical 
characteristics.32  The issue essentially became how broadly to construe the 
term “sex” as a protected class under Title VII.33 
After declaring that the statute should be given its plain meaning, the court 
concluded that the intent of Congress was solely to include traditional notions 
of “sex.”34  The court further supported its conclusion by highlighting the fact 
that while several bills had been introduced to amend the Civil Rights Act to 
prohibit discrimination against “sexual preference,” none had yet been enacted 
into law.35  Also, after examining the traditional indicia of suspect 
classification, the court concluded that transsexuals are not a suspect class, as it 
found that “transsexuals are not necessarily a ‘discrete and insular 
minority’36 . . . nor had it been established that transsexuality is an ‘immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth’ like race or national 
origin.”37  These arguments were reiterated in other circuits. 
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.,38 decided in the Eighth Circuit, 
adhered to a similarly narrow interpretation of the protectional scope of Title 
 
 26. Id. at 661. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661. 
 31. Id. at 662. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. 
 36. Id. at 663 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)). 
 37. Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).  However, despite the 
fact that the court argues that transsexuality is not an “immutable characteristic,” it is important to 
note that not all of the protected categories under Title VII are in fact immutable—such as 
religion, for example. 
 38. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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VII.  The plaintiff in Sommers claimed to be a “female with the anatomical 
body of a male.”39  Sommers was hired by Budget on April 22, 1980 to 
perform clerical duties and was fired two days later.40  Budget alleged that her 
employment was terminated because she misrepresented herself as an 
“anatomical female” when she applied for the job and because this 
misrepresentation led to a disruption of the company’s work routine.41  
Sommers brought suit against Budget, claiming that she should be afforded 
protection under Title VII since according to Sommers, the court should not be 
confined to the biological meaning of the term “sex,” but rather should include 
coverage to protect those who are psychologically female, albeit biologically 
male.42 
Rejecting such an expansion, the trial court ruled against the plaintiff and 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment.43  After noting that this was the first 
time the Eighth Circuit dealt with such an issue, it agreed with the district court 
that for the purposes of Title VII, the court should be bound to the plain 
meaning of “sex” due to the absence of clear congressional intent to the 
contrary.44  In support of its holding, the court also emphasized that the 
legislative history was devoid of any intention to include transsexuals as a 
protected category under Title VII.45 
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, the Seventh Circuit denied protection to 
transgendered individuals, holding that Congress intended only to prohibit 
discrimination “against women because they are women and against men 
because they are men.”46  Ulane, hired as a pilot for Eastern Airlines in 1968, 
was diagnosed as a transsexual in 1979.47  Later, Ulane started taking female 
hormones and, in 1980, underwent “sex reassignment surgery.”48  After this 
surgery, Illinois gave her a revised birth certificate, indicating that Ulane was 
now a female.49  Ulane was also re-certified as a female for her flight status.50  
However, upon learning of Ulane’s sex reassignment, Eastern Airlines 
terminated her employment in 1981.51 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 749. 
 43. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 748. 
 44. Id. at 750. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 47. Id. at 1082–83. 
 48. Id. at 1083. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082. 
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The district court ruled in favor of Ulane, noting that while homosexuals 
and transvestites52 do not have Title VII protection, for diagnosed transsexuals 
who have sexual identity problems, the term “sex” in Title VII includes 
“sexual identity” as a protected category.53  The district court justified its 
conclusion by finding that sex is partly a “psychological question—a question 
of self-perception; and . . . part[ly] a social matter—a question of how society 
perceives the individual.”54 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the district court’s holding that the 
statutory word “sex” applies to transsexual individuals erroneous.55  In support 
of its reversal, the Seventh Circuit noted that with statutory construction, words 
should be given their ordinary, common meaning, absent a contrary 
definition.56  Noting a “total lack of legislative history supporting the sex 
amendment coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption,” the 
court stated that “Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 
legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.”57 
The court also noted that other courts have specifically held that Title VII 
does not protect transsexuals from discrimination and that Congress has still 
continued to reject proposed amendments related to affectional or sexual 
orientation.58  Additionally, the court highlighted the fact that the only two 
other circuit court cases that had specifically addressed the issue—Sommers v. 
Budget Marketing in the Eighth Circuit and Holloway v. Arthur Anderson in 
the Ninth Circuit—both held that discrimination against transsexuals does not 
fall within the protectional scope of Title VII.59 
However, this more traditional and conservative line of reasoning 
evidenced in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits was overshadowed by a 
broader construction of sex and gender in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.60  The plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was a female 
partnership candidate who was refused admission as partner in an accounting 
firm.61  There were clear signs that some of the partners reacted negatively to 
Hopkins’ personality because she was a woman.62  She was told that she could 
improve her chances for partnership if she were to take “a course at charm 
 
 52. “Transvestite” is a synonym for “transgendered.”  See WEBSTER NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1243 (1973).  In other words, transvestites dress as the opposite gender and have not 
necessarily taken hormones or undergone sex reassignment surgery.  Id. 
 53. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1087. 
 56. Id. at 1085. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 235. 
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school,” “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”63  In previous years, 
other female candidates up for partnership had also been evaluated in similarly 
sex-based terms.64 
Despite previous arguments to the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Title VII prohibits the “entire spectrum” of discrimination on the basis of 
sex, including that based on gender stereotypes, as opposed to being limited to 
discrimination on the basis of biological sex, and emphasized that it was the 
original intent of Congress to do so.65  The Court also noted that “in the 
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a 
belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on 
the basis of gender.”66 
This refined understanding of sex-stereotyping expanded the protectional 
scope of Title VII to include those discriminated against because their behavior 
did not coincide with traditional gender-stereotypical expectations.  
Broadening the concept of sex to include social constructions of gender was a 
big shift in the legal understanding of the “because of sex” clause in Title VII.  
As far as many circuits were concerned,67 the combination of the lack of 
legislative history and the lack of specific indication that Congress 
contemplated the inclusion of transsexuals and transgendered people under 
Title VII dictated that “sex” under Title VII should be given its plain, 
biologically understood, meaning.  Clearly, Price Waterhouse took a different 
approach to the issue. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that Price Waterhouse did not deal with a 
transsexual, transgendered, or homosexual plaintiff, but rather, a heterosexual 
female claiming discrimination based on her failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes, the findings in this U.S. Supreme Court case had far-reaching 
implications for other cases denying protection to transsexual, transgendered, 
and homosexual plaintiffs, based on a strictly narrow definition of “sex” that 
was formerly rooted and expressed in simple biological terms.68  Former 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 236. 
 65. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer 
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
associated with their group, for “‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” 
Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978)). 
 66. Id. at 250. 
 67. As previously decided in the 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits. 
 68. See Romeo, supra note 12, at 742. 
  The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been overruled by 
the logic and language of Price Waterhouse. . . . What matters, for purposes of this part of 
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decisions uniformly denying protection to transsexual, transgendered, and 
homosexual individuals under Title VII soon came under scrutiny again in 
light of this U.S. Supreme Court decision challenging traditional notions of 
what it means to be discriminated against “because of sex.”69 
III.  AFTER PRICE WATERHOUSE: CASES INVOLVING 
TRANSGENDERED/TRANSSEXUAL PLAINTIFFS 
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s more expansive view of what “sex” 
entails under Title VII protection, some courts refused to interpret such a 
liberal understanding to apply to transsexual and transgendered individuals, 
and instead, still adhered to the more traditional approach articulated in circuit 
court cases preceding Price Waterhouse,70 thereby continuing to define sex in 
strictly biological terms.71  In Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Corp., the court held that the 
term “sex” should be narrowly construed, according to its biological meaning 
(distinct from gender) and that Title VII does not protect transsexuals from 
such discrimination.72 
In Dobre, the “plaintiff asserted that she was discriminated against because 
of her new gender while in the process of transforming her body to conform 
with her psychological sexual identity.”73  The court emphasized that “sex,” as 
used in Title VII, is not synonymous with gender and that the term “sex” in 
Title VII, as explained earlier in Holloway, refers to biological and anatomical 
characteristics only.74  The court stated that at the very worst, the plaintiff was 
discriminated against because “she was perceived as a male who wanted to 
 
the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is 
related to the sex of the victim: here, for example, the perpetrator’s actions stem from the 
fact that he believed that the victim was a man who ‘failed to act like’ one. 
  This analysis is useful in two ways.  First, it recognizes that sex discrimination 
claims encompass both discrimination based upon anatomical sex and discrimination 
based upon gender roles.  Second, it acknowledges that the relevant factor in 
discrimination claims is the mindset of the perpetrator.  Thus, the inquiry is appropriately 
directed towards the perpetrator’s perception of a gender nonconforming person, rather 
than into the legitimacy of the complainant’s gender identity or an examination of the 
complainant’s body. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 69. See Lloyd, supra note 22, at 176. 
 70. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. 
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 
659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 71. See Lloyd, supra note 22, at 177. 
 72. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286–87 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 73. Id. at 286. 
 74. Id. 
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become a female,” and the court concluded that such discrimination is not 
prohibited by Title VII.75 
Some courts, however, have been slightly less narrow than the court in 
Dobre in their approach and interpretation of what Title VII entails.76  In 
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., Antonio Sanchez claimed that 
he was verbally harassed by some male co-workers and a supervisor because 
he was effeminate and did not meet their views of a stereotypical male.77  The 
court held that although harassment based on the perception that someone is 
effeminate is discrimination “because of sex” in violation of Title VII, it was 
not meant to imply that “all gender-based distinctions are actionable under 
Title VII. . . . For example . . . [it] does not imply that there is any violation of 
Title VII occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and female 
employees to conform to different dress and grooming standards.”78 
Despite the court’s hesitation to more broadly expand the protectional 
scope of Title VII, it still held that DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph 
Co.,79 which pre-dated and conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Price Waterhouse, is no longer good law.80  As a result, Nichols held that a 
male employee is entitled to protection under Title VII if he can prove that he 
was discriminated against based on his refusal to conform to traditional gender 
stereotypes about appearance and behavior.81  While the court did not seem to 
fully embrace Price Waterhouse, it still recognized the possibility of an action 
based on a failure to conform to traditional gender stereotypes—in some 
contexts. 
Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.,82 yet another case following a more 
conservative interpretation of the definition of “sex” under Title VII (despite 
the holding in Price Waterhouse) showed a similar hesitation for a broader 
application of Title VII protection in the context of transgendered and 
transsexual plaintiffs.  In this case, the plaintiff was diagnosed with having 
transvestic fetishism with gender dysphoria83 and Gender Identity Disorder 
 
 75. Id. at 287.  The court’s arguments here showed a clear intention to treat a transsexual as 
one who chooses a deviant lifestyle, as it emphasized her choice and desires to be the opposite 
sex. 
 76. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 77. Id. at 869. 
 78. Id. at 875, n.7. 
 79. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 80. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875. 
 81. Id. at 874. 
 82. No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
 83. Two key criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis of “transvestic fetishism” include:  
(1) Recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, urges, or behavior, involving cross-dressing; 
(2) This causes clinically significant distress or impairment, whether socially, at work, or 
elsewhere. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 575 (4th ed. 2000). 
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(GID).84  Oiler was a heterosexual man and was not a transsexual, nor did he 
intend to become a woman—he was a male crossdresser.85  After his employer 
discovered his cross-dressing behavior, Oiler’s employment was involuntarily 
terminated after he refused to resign.86  After receiving a “Dismissal and 
Notice of Rights,” which was issued by the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Oiler filed suit against his employer for 
discrimination on the basis of sexual stereotyping, alleging that termination of 
his employment for his off-duty acts of cross-dressing and impersonating a 
woman is a form of forbidden sexual stereotyping.87 
The court assumed that the definition of gender stereotyping was not broad 
enough to include those afflicted with GID or those who dress like the opposite 
sex.88  As with prior cases,89 the Oiler court noted that the legislative history 
does not show any intention to include transsexualism in Title VII.90  The court 
also noted that, as in these prior cases, from 1981 through 2001, thirty-one 
 
 84. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1.  Gender Identity Disorder is recognized by the 
American Psychological Association (APA) and is a currently diagnosable mental disorder 
according to the 4th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 
IV).  This current edition of the DSM IV has five criteria that must be met before a diagnosis of 
Gender Identity Disorder can be given: (1) There must be evidence of a strong and persistent 
cross-gender identification; (2) This cross-gender identification must not merely be a desire for 
any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex; (3) There must also be evidence of 
persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role 
of that sex; (4) The individual must not have a concurrent physical intersex condition (e.g., 
androgen insensitivity syndrome or congenital adrenal hyperplasia); (5) There must be evidence 
of clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.  AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 83, at 581. 
 85. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1.  A male crossdresser is synonymous with the term 
“transvestite.”  Id.  The term “transgendered,” according to the court, can be defined as: 
An umbrella term used to refer to a diverse group of individuals who cross or transcend 
culturally-defined categories of gender.  They include crossdressers or transvestites (who 
desire to wear clothing associated with another sex), male-to-female and female-to-male 
transsexuals (who pursue or have undergone hormone therapy or sex reassignment 
surgery), transgenderists (who live in the gender role associated with another sex without 
desiring sex reassignment surgery), bigender persons (who identify as both man and 
woman), drag queens and kings (usually gay men and lesbian women who do ‘drag’ and 
dress up in, respectively, women’s and men’s clothes), and female and male 
impersonators (males who impersonate women and females who impersonate men, 
usually for entertainment). 
Id. at *1 n.9. 
 86. Id. at *2. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *6. 
 89. The court cited to such prior cases as Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th 
Cir. 1984), Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) and Sommers v. 
Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 90. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6. 
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proposed bills had been introduced that had attempted to amend Title VII and 
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of affection or sexual 
orientation, yet none had passed.91  Even when referencing Price Waterhouse, 
the court found this precedent not controlling because Oiler was not a plaintiff 
who failed to conform to a gender stereotype, but rather, was a man terminated 
because he was a man with a sexual or gender identity disorder who cross-
dressed.92 
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s broader construction of the definition of 
sex for the purpose of protection against discrimination in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, courts were very reluctant to extend protection to transsexuals, 
transgendereds, and homosexuals.93  Notwithstanding subsequent court 
decisions refusing to accept this expanded definition of sex, the distinction 
between gender stereotyping and gender-related non-conforming behavior 
inevitably became blurred after the decision in Price Waterhouse.94  
Consequently, this situation opened the gates for lawsuits brought by 
transsexual, transgendered, and homosexual individuals seeking protection 
pursuant to Title VII.  Although there were some failed attempts, as seen in 
Dobre, Nichols, and Oiler, the Sixth Circuit decided to take another look and 
re-examine the rights of gender non-conformists in light of the Price 
Waterhouse decision.95 
IV.  GROUND-BREAKING CASE IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT: SMITH V. CITY OF SALEM 
The landmark case of Smith v. City of Salem, decided by the Sixth Circuit 
in August 2004, explicitly and deliberately expanded the scope of Title VII to 
protect transgendered people under the “because of sex” clause.96  The plaintiff 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Lloyd, supra note 22, at 177. 
 94. See Melinda Chow, Smith v. City of Salem: Transgendered Jurisprudence and an 
Expanding Meaning of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 207, 215 
(2005). 
Even when courts have accepted the proposition that gender discrimination is included in 
the sex discrimination forbidden by Title VII and that Title VII prohibits sex stereotyping, 
they sometimes still deny protection to transgendered people by distinguishing Ann 
Hopkins’s predicament in Price Waterhouse from more extreme forms of gender 
nonconformity.  The courts that have taken this approach appear to believe that 
discrimination against transsexuals, transvestites, and transgendered people “is of a 
different and permissible sort.”  These courts insist that Title VII does not cover 
transsexuals because there is something categorically different between an effeminate 
male and a transgendered male that moves discrimination against transgendered males 
into the realm of permissible gender discrimination. 
Id. at 210. 
 95. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 96. Id. at 568. 
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in Smith was employed by the City of Salem, Ohio, as a lieutenant in the Salem 
Fire Department.97  He was born a male and was subsequently diagnosed with 
GID.98  After being diagnosed, Smith began expressing himself in a more 
feminine manner on a full-time basis, including at work.99  Soon after, his co-
workers began questioning Smith and commenting on his feminine 
appearance, indicating disapproval of his cross-gender behavior.100  Because of 
this, Smith notified his immediate supervisor about his GID diagnosis and 
treatment, as well as the likelihood that his treatment would eventually include 
complete physical transformation from male to female.101 
Later, a meeting was held to discuss Smith and to devise a plan for 
terminating his employment.102  A self-described transsexual, Smith brought a 
Title VII action against the city and various city officials alleging sex 
discrimination after he was fired.103  The district court dismissed the claims 
pursuant to Rule 12(c).104  However, on appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.105  Although the district court was following 
precedent formerly set in other circuits, the Sixth Circuit decided to re-examine 
this case, in light of the decision in Price Waterhouse.106 
The main thrust of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion and ultimate reasoning was 
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court’s extension of the “because of sex” 
clause in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins to prohibit sexual discrimination based 
on gender non-conforming behavior.107  The Sixth Circuit merely applied this 
extension to transgendered individuals.108  Rejecting the “rigid boundaries of 
sex identity laid out by other circuits,”109 the Sixth Circuit recognized that 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  “Gender Identity Disorder” is characterized by the American Psychiatric Association 
as a “disjunction between an individual’s sexual organs and sexual identity.”  Id.  For the APA’s 
requirements for diagnosis of this mental disorder, please see supra note 84. 
 99. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 567–68. 
 104. Smith, 378 F.3d at 569. 
 105. Id. at 578. 
 106. Id. at 571. 
 107. Id. at 573. 
 108. Id. at 575. 
 109. Thomas Ling, supra note 13, at 279. 
[T]he approach in Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane . . . has been eviscerated by Price 
Waterhouse . . . . By holding that Title VII protected a woman who failed to conform to 
social expectations concerning how a woman should look and behave, the Supreme Court 
established that Title VII’s reference to “sex” encompasses both the biological differences 
between men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a 
failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms. 
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discrimination based on traditional notions of masculinity and femininity for 
both men and women must be understood as unequal treatment that is 
prohibited by Title VII.110 
  More than protecting transsexuals, the Smith court’s matured 
understanding of “sex” promises reform across the broad landscape of sexual 
inequality.  Smith upturns rigid sex categories and allows both sexes to 
participate in the full range of gender expressions. . . . 
  [It] is, thus, at the forefront of an ongoing battle between individual liberty 
and the social impulse toward sexual conformity.  But Smith represents more 
than one side of a cultural divide.  It brings coherence to broken doctrines and 
preserves the law’s respect for individual choice in matters of identity and 
sexual expression.111 
The reasoning in Smith seemed to follow a more progressive and liberal 
interpretation of what type of rights Title VII protects.  While many have 
argued that the categories in Title VII are protected because they are 
immutable and not “chosen,”112 the Sixth Circuit clearly deviated from this line 
of reasoning in deciding to protect people who arguably “choose” their sexual 
identity. 
There is nothing immutable about deciding to dress as the opposite sex, or 
taking hormones, or undergoing sex reassignment surgery.  Extending 
protection to those people who otherwise might be considered social deviants 
changed the way Title VII was to be viewed.  Historical notions of Title VII 
protecting women, just by virtue of the fact that they are born women, has 
become the simplest way to view sex as a protected category.  Now 
considering “sex” to be something mutable changes original ideas and notions 
of what protecting someone based on their “sex” really entails.  Protecting an 
individual’s choice in the matter, especially one that diverges so drastically 
from current cultural norms of conforming to and accepting the sex one is 
biologically born with, was a surprisingly liberal and progressive approach that 
has yet to be embraced by other circuits. 
The holding in Smith, which interprets Price Waterhouse to prohibit sexual 
discrimination based on gender non-conforming behavior under Title VII, was 
reinforced in a March 2005 decision, Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, which holds 
that based on this same premise, transsexuals are protected under Title VII .113  
Barnes was a police officer who was a pre-operative male-to-female 
transsexual.114  Barnes passed the sergeants exam for the Cincinnati Police 
 
Smith, 378 F.3d at 573. 
 110. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574–75. 
 111. Ling, supra note 13, at 285, 287. 
 112. For example, race and national origin. 
 113. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 733. 
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Department but failed the probationary period after being subjected to a 
rigorous training program.115  Claiming that this probation failure was due to 
illegal discrimination based on his failure to conform to sex stereotypes, 
Barnes brought suit against the City of Cincinnati.116 
Noting the decision in Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit emphasized 
that transsexuals, as a class, are entitled to Title VII protection.117  The court 
stated: 
Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is 
impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a 
label, such as “transsexual,” is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the 
victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-
conformity.118 
Although gender identity and sexual orientation are not among Title VII’s 
expressly protected categories, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff stated a 
claim for illegal sex discrimination because of his failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes.119  Labeling oneself as transgendered or transsexual does not 
change the fact that he or she is discriminated against for failure to conform to 
gender stereotypes.  Other courts in the past have treated transsexuals and 
transgendered individuals differently than presumed heterosexuals with regard 
to Title VII claims based on the failure to conform to gender stereotypes.  The 
reinforcement of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, a year after the Smith decision, 
gave greater weight to the original holding in Smith.  The consequences of the 
Sixth Circuit’s action and subsequent affirmation of protecting transgendered 
and transsexual individuals has yet to be addressed in many courts across the 
country and surely will create much controversy, as the protected groups 
themselves are controversial. 
V.  REFUSAL TO EXPAND THE PROTECTIONAL SCOPE OF TITLE VII BASED ON 
SEXUALITY 
One such case has recently surfaced regarding this very issue since the 
holdings in Smith v. City of Salem and Barnes v. City of Cincinnati.120  The 
narrow line of reasoning expressed in other cases before Smith has not 
disappeared, but rather, has been reaffirmed despite the expanded reading in 
the Sixth Circuit.  Emphasizing that only congressional intent and the plain 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 737. 
 118. Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 
2004)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, No. 2:04CV616DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah 
June 24, 2005). 
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language of the statute should matter, some courts will surely disregard the 
Sixth Circuit’s interpretation that the holding in Price Waterhouse protects 
individuals discriminated against based on gender non-conforming behavior. 
Only one case has emerged since the Sixth Circuit’s controversial new 
holdings.  In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority,121 a transgendered woman’s 
discrimination claim that she was terminated because of her sex (in violation of 
Title VII) was dismissed.  The plaintiff, Krystal Etsitty, was a transsexual who 
was diagnosed with GID.122  In October of 2001, Etsitty accepted a job 
working as an operator for the Utah Transit Authority (UTA).123  At the time 
she applied for the job with UTA and throughout her training period, Etsitty 
dressed as a man and used the men’s restroom.124  Shortly after she was hired, 
Etsitty told her supervisor that she was a transsexual and would be appearing 
more traditionally female at work.125 
The manager of operations later heard that one of the employees was a 
man dressing like a woman.126  Concern was then expressed as to the plaintiff 
using female restrooms if she had male genitalia.127  The supervisor and 
manager of operations then called a meeting with Etsitty to check her status 
with respect to the sex change process.128  Confirming that she had not yet had 
any kind of sex reassignment surgery, her employers became more concerned 
about potential UTA liability based on complaints they might receive about 
Etsitty using a ladies’ restroom.129  They ultimately decided to fire Etsitty for 
this reason.130 
Etsitty argued that she was dismissed because of her employer’s belief that 
she did not conform to gender stereotypes.131  The court began its analysis by 
noting that “every federal court that has dealt directly with this issue has held 
that ‘Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on an individual’s 
transsexualism.’”132  Agreeing with the reasoning expressed in Ulane, the court 
emphasized that its responsibility is “to interpret th[e] congressional legislation 
 
 121. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, No. 2:04CV616DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah June 
24, 2005). 
 122. Id. at *1.  For a description of the requirements of a GID diagnosis, see supra note 84. 
 123. Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *1. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *1. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *3 (citing Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F.Supp. 2d 996, 999 (N.D. Ohio 2003), 
aff’d, No. 03-3344, 2004 WL 1166553 (6th Cir. May 18, 2004); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
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and determine what Congress intended when it decided to outlaw 
discrimination based on sex.”133 
As a result, the court refused to expand the application of Title VII beyond 
the “clear intent of Congress, absent a mandate from Congress to do so,” since 
in its view, Congress had a narrow concept of sex in mind when passing the 
Civil Rights Act.134  The court further noted that a new interpretation of the 
“because of sex” clause of Title VII to include anything other than biological 
sex must first come from Congress and is otherwise unwarranted.135 
Next, the court’s analysis entailed a rejection of other courts’ application 
of the Price Waterhouse prohibition against sex stereotyping to transsexuals.136  
The court strongly disagreed with such interpretations of Price Waterhouse, 
and instead, emphasized that 
[t]here is a huge difference between a woman who does not behave as 
femininely as her employer thinks she should, and a man who is attempting to 
change his sex and appearance to be a woman.  Such drastic action cannot be 
fairly characterized as a mere failure to conform to stereotypes.137 
After rejecting such an interpretation of the Price Waterhouse holding and 
other expansions of Title VII absent clear congressional intent, and essentially 
following the line of cases related to the holding in Ulane v. Eastern 
Airlines,138 the trial judge held that transgendered people are not protected 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.139 
VI.  UNANIMOUS REFUSAL TO EXPAND THE PROTECTIONAL SCOPE OF TITLE 
VII TO INCLUDE DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
Unlike the spotty protection for transgendered and transsexual individuals, 
an avowedly homosexual plaintiff is limited to state and local laws prohibiting 
sexual orientation discrimination unless she or he can prove discrimination 
“because of sex” for failing or refusing to comply with socially accepted 
gender roles.  While transgendered and transsexual individuals have achieved 
some success (in the Sixth Circuit in particular), courts have consistently 
refused to allow gender stereotyping claims to be used to “bootstrap protection 
for sexual orientation into Title VII.”140 
Although the courts have shown some inclination to expand the 
protectional scope and broaden the circle of protection, as in the case with 
 
 133. Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *3. 
 134. Id. at *4. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at *5. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 139. Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *7. 
 140. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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transgendereds and transsexuals for not conforming to gender stereotypes, it 
has become evident in cases involving homosexual plaintiffs that the courts 
have yet to protect them under this same line of reasoning, despite the fact that 
in preferring same-sex partners, they are in fact often discriminated against for 
not conforming to heterosexual gender stereotypes of engaging in activities 
with opposite sex partners.  The way courts address the issue clearly shows an 
intention to keep homosexuals as a separate class not entitled to gender 
stereotyping protection, as many courts continue to do in refusing to extend the 
gender stereotyping rationale to apply to transgendered and transsexual 
plaintiffs based on the fact that they are transgendered or transsexual. 
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.141 was one of the first 
cases to address the rights of homosexuals under Title VII.  DeSantis consisted 
of three consolidated cases, all dealing with homosexual plaintiffs who were 
seeking protection from employment discrimination under Title VII.142  The 
court rejected their claims, concluding that in the drafting of Title VII, 
Congress only intended for its protectional scope to cover traditional notions of 
sex and not discrimination based on sexual orientation.143  The court quoted 
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen extensively, noting the lack of legislative history 
and the court’s decision in Holloway to give Title VII its “plain meaning.”144  
The court further noted that discrimination because of effeminancy or 
transsexualism likewise does not fall within the protectional scope of Title 
VII.145 
A Second Circuit decision, Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble,146 shows how 
difficult it is for an openly homosexual discrimination claimant to use sexual 
stereotyping to gain Title VII protection.  Dawn Dawson, a self-described 
lesbian female who did not conform to gender norms, in that she did not meet 
stereotypical expectations of femininity and may have been perceived as more 
masculine than a stereotypical woman, claimed that she suffered 
discrimination on the basis of sex, sex stereotyping, and/or sexual 
orientation.147 
Refusing to extend protection to Dawson, the court noted that although 
“stereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often 
necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality,” Title VII 
does not protect homosexuals simply based on their orientation.148  Quoting 
 
 141. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 142. Id. at 328. 
 143. Id. at 332. 
 144. Id. at 329. 
 145. Id. at 332. 
 146. 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 147. Id. at 213. 
 148. Id. at 218 (quoting Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)). 
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Simonton v. Runyon,149 the court stated that “[t]he law is well-settled in this 
circuit and in all others to have reached the question that . . . Title VII does not 
prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.”150  
Because of this problem, the court noted that plaintiffs often fall short in their 
Title VII pursuits because they are simply trying to make sexual orientation 
allegations “masquerading as gender stereotyping claims.”151 
Yet another case, Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, examined a 
homosexual plaintiff’s claim of employment discrimination under Title VII, 
but rejected the idea that Price Waterhouse’s holding to prohibit discrimination 
based on failure to conform to gender stereotypes extended to protect 
homosexuals.152  The harassment that Kay endured while in the employment of 
Independence Blue Cross included such incidents as a photocopied flyer for a 
gay phone line that was left in Kay’s mailbox that contained a typed line of 
text reading “A real man in the corporate world would not come to work with 
an earring in his ear.  But I guess you will never be a ‘real man’!!!!!!!”153  
Additionally, one of Kay’s co-workers, referring to another male employee in 
front of Kay, said “I’m glad that there’s a real man on the floor.”154 
Despite the fact that these comments may have been highly gender-
motivated in that Kay was ridiculed for not being stereotypically masculine, 
the court denied protection to Kay.  Interestingly, the court attempted to 
distinguish between discrimination based on gender stereotyping and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, finding, not too surprisingly, that 
this particular case fell under the latter, and thus, Kay was not protected under 
Title VII.155  The court supported this holding by explaining that since most of 
the discrimination and harassment he suffered was prefaced with or 
 
[I]ndividual employees who face adverse employment actions as a result of their 
employer’s animus toward their exhibition of behavior considered to be stereotypically 
inappropriate for their gender may have a claim under Title VII.  When utilized by an 
avowedly homosexual plaintiff, however, gender stereotyping claims can easily present 
problems for an adjudicator.  This is for the simple reason that “[s]tereotypical notions 
about how men and women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about 
heterosexuality and homosexuality.” 
Id. 
 149. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 150. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 217.  The court here made an effort to separate the idea of sexual 
orientation from sex stereotypes, although the two are arguably, at the very least, not mutually 
exclusive ideas.  There is overlap and conflation that makes the argument a weak one. 
 151. Id. at 218 (quoting LEX K. LARSON, 10 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 168.10[1] (2d 
ed. 2003)). 
 152. Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 Fed. Appx. 48, 51 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 153. Id. at 50. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 51. 
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accompanied by references to his sexual orientation, he was not protected 
under Title VII.156 
It appears from this opinion that had there not been implications or explicit 
reference to his sexual orientation, this would have otherwise been an 
actionable claim under Title VII given that the ridicule was largely based on 
Kay’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes by being stereotypically 
masculine.  For some elusive reason not explicitly stated in the opinion, 
however, the court decided that gender stereotyping did not apply in the case a 
of gay man who did not act like a stereotypical (“gender stereotype-
conforming”) straight man.  The similarities between this case and the gender 
stereotyping that occurred in Price Waterhouse, where Hopkins (the plaintiff) 
did not act “feminine” enough for a woman, are very strong.  The only 
apparent difference is that Kay was gay, whereas Hopkins, presumably, was 
not, or at least had she been a homosexual, reference to her orientation was not 
mentioned. 
VII.  ANTICIPATED EXPANSION TO INCLUDE HOMOSEXUALS: POLICY, 
RATIONALE, AND PROBLEMS WITH EXPANDING TO INCLUDE SEXUALITY BUT 
NOT ORIENTATION 
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Title VII to protect transsexuals is at 
odds with prior holdings in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.157  Such 
conflicting cases include Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Holloway v. Arthur 
Anderson, and Sommers v. Budget Marketing, which all pre-date the Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins holding.158  Because of this conflict, since the recent 
Sixth Circuit decisions in Smith v. City of Salem and Barnes v. Cincinnati, 
these previous holdings in other circuits are susceptible to renewed challenges 
in the near future.159  However, it is not yet clear if the Sixth Circuit is an 
“anomaly in an otherwise settled area of the law” or rather, if it signals a new 
trend.160 
Despite the lack of a clear answer to this question, it is important to note 
that society’s increasing acceptance of sexual orientations and identities other 
 
 156. Id. “[T]he only reasonable reading of this record compels the conclusion that the 
reprehensible conduct Kay alleges was motivated by sexual orientation bias rather than gender 
stereotyping.”  Id. 
 157. Vedder Price, Sixth Circuit Says Title VII Protects Transsexuals From Sex Stereotyping, 
LAB. L. (Vedder Price), Oct. 2004, at 5, 5, available at http://vedderprice.com/ (Follow “News & 
Publications” Link; Select “Labor & Employment Law” and click “Go;” Scroll to October 2004 
entries and click “Labor Law”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 4. 
 160. Stephen Allred, Gender Stereotyping Claims Filed by Gender Bending Employees, 
WORKCITE: EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFITS LEGAL UPDATE, Oct. 27, 2005, http://www.hmw.com/ 
workcite/20051027.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
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than straight heterosexuality—including, but not limited to, homosexuality, 
transsexualism and transvestitism—may be influencing such decisions, thereby 
signaling a new trend.161  Because of the more liberal interpretations of the 
“because of sex” clause within Title VII and an overall trend toward increasing 
acceptance toward those not conforming to heterosexual norms, employers 
would be well-advised to proceed accordingly in their hiring and employment 
practices.162  In particular, “[e]mployers should proceed cautiously in dealing 
with employees exhibiting transsexual tendencies or declaring themselves to be 
transsexuals, and are encouraged to seek legal counsel on how to respond to 
issues as they arise.”163  Despite the fact that federal law does not yet prohibit 
discrimination based on sexuality or sexual orientation, plaintiffs could find 
ways around this dilemma by phrasing their discrimination differently.  At 
present, it is clear that the judicial reasoning is weak, at best, in trying to 
distinguish what types of people are protected for not conforming to gender 
stereotypes. 
Although Congress has yet to explicitly include those discriminated against 
based on sexuality and sexual orientation, recent case law suggests a 
liberalization of such notions of discrimination based on sex, and formerly 
distinct lines are becoming blurred and nearly unrecognizable.164  In short, 
“[t]he legal and social conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation 
logically require this extension of sex discrimination law.”165 
[L]ike transsexuals, homosexuals can be seen as extreme nonconformers; they 
do not conform to the stereotype that men ought to desire women sexually or 
that women ought to desire men sexually. . . . Traditional notions of sex and 
gender are transgressed by both homosexuals and transsexuals . . . .  Extending 
Title VII protection to people discriminated against on the basis of sexual 
orientation is an important step toward achieving this goal.166 
Especially in the Sixth Circuit, it would be difficult to justify protection of 
transgendereds and transsexuals under the gender stereotyping rationale, but 
not homosexuals.  While many courts are holding fast to the traditional line of 
reasoning, it is problematic to ignore the precedent set forth in Price 
Waterhouse about gender stereotyping.  
Despite the lack of a clear legislative mandate explicitly granting 
protection to those deviating from heterosexual norms, the recent broadening 
of courts’ interpretations as to what discrimination “because of sex” 
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encompasses and the blurred notions of what constitutes sex and what 
constitutes sexual orientation, the likelihood of employer liability based on 
such discrimination is greatly increased.167  Distinguishing between “because 
of sex” and “because of sexual orientation” has become increasingly difficult, 
and consequently, could be determined solely based on how the plaintiff 
phrases the allegations in the complaint.168  As a result, it has been strongly 
recommended that employers refrain from taking comfort in the lack of current 
legislation prohibiting such discrimination.169 
VIII.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
As stated earlier, the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Price 
Waterhouse was clear.  The Court held that Title VII prohibited the “entire 
spectrum” of discrimination on the basis of sex, including that based on gender 
stereotyping, as opposed to being limited to discrimination on the basis of 
biological sex.170  The Court further emphasized that sex stereotyping occurs 
when an employer acts on the basis of a belief that only men can be aggressive 
and that women cannot be aggressive.171  Such an assumption and consequent 
discrimination based on this belief constitutes sex stereotyping prohibited by 
Title VII under the “because of sex” clause. 
The clarity of this holding became unnecessarily muddled when courts 
tried to apply it, yet still wanted to exclude transgendered, transsexual, and 
homosexuals from protection under Title VII.  If courts had applied the sex 
stereotyping rationale as simply as the Supreme Court had done in Price 
Waterhouse, many claims brought by people of differing sexual identities 
clearly would be protected.  The reluctance of courts to follow the lead of 
Price Waterhouse resulted in a creation of a type of categorical exception for 
those groups that courts did not want Title VII to protect. 
One of the most commonly used arguments opposing extending the 
protectional scope of the “because of sex” clause to include more than just 
those people discriminated against because they were born a biological male or 
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bi-sexual employees could very well lead to employer liability. 
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female is the lack of legislative history, as well as the lack of clearly expressed 
congressional intent to protect transgendered, transsexual, or homosexual 
individuals.  Accordingly, it is important to understand the context in which 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed. 
The main thrust behind passing the Civil Rights Act was to protect racial 
minorities.172  The civil rights movement in the 1950s and early 1960s focused 
national attention on racial injustice.173  In response to this national attention, 
President Kennedy sent a draft of the Civil Rights Bill to Congress, where it 
was hotly debated.174  While debating, Howard W. Smith of Virginia, chairman 
of the Rules Committee and also a “staunch opponent of all civil rights 
legislation,” spoke up and offered the word “sex” to be amended to Title 
VII.175  His efforts to do this were, in effect, motivated by a desire to defeat the 
bill entirely.176  Much to Smith’s chagrin, after several hours of debating, the 
amendment passed by a vote of 168 to 133.177  Simply stated, the “prohibition 
of employment discrimination on the basis of sex was not a widely debated, 
thoroughly researched policy proposal.”178  Prior to the passing of this federal 
legislation, only two states—Hawaii and Wisconsin—had laws prohibiting sex 
discrimination in employment.179 
While ambiguity in a statute often logically leads to examination of its 
legislative history, the complete lack of legislative history and clear 
congressional intent on the “because of sex” clause is not helpful in this 
instance.  Nonetheless, it is commonly argued by the courts following more of 
a narrow interpretation of the “because of sex” clause that the absence of a 
clear legislative intent for a broad interpretation of the “because of sex” clause 
is a legitimate basis to deny protection to these individuals.  As previously 
described, the main driving force behind Title VII was to provide protection to 
racial minorities.  That was the main concern and purpose of the Act.  The sex 
amendment was thrown in, quite ironically, in an attempt to defeat the Act, just 
hours before Congress voted on it.  These circumstances were not by any 
means normal, and did not provide for a legislative history that would have 
otherwise been useful and illustrative in the present-day debate on the original 
intent and idea of the “because of sex” clause in Title VII.  Thus, arguments 
focusing on the lack of legislative history and clear congressional intent as a 
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means of supporting the opposition to expansion are weak and should not be 
given much weight or credit as a deciding factor. 
Similarly, courts focused on the fact that at the time of enactment, it could 
not be inferred that such individuals would be protected.  To say that 
discrimination based on being transgendered, transsexual, or homosexual was 
not contemplated at the time of passing the Act should be quite obvious, if for 
no other reason than the fact that such individuals have only in recent decades 
been widely recognized in society.  Still, many people today do not know what 
it means to be “transgendered” or “transsexual” and the corresponding 
differences between the two classifications.  Just because a condition or 
classification of individuals was relatively unknown at the time of the passing 
of an Act does not mean that such people are not protected. 
These flawed arguments were criticized by the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. 
City of Salem, where the court refused to follow the narrow line of reasoning 
supported by most other courts in light of the new gender stereotyping 
rationale enunciated in Price Waterhouse.  In Smith, the Sixth Circuit 
recognized that discrimination based on traditional notions of masculinity and 
femininity for both men and women constitutes the exact type of 
discrimination that Title VII prohibits, as articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Price Waterhouse.180  The Sixth Circuit did not shy away from Price 
Waterhouse’s holding, unlike other courts before and since Smith that have 
either tried to ignore Price Waterhouse or have tried to create a categorical 
exception for those people that are considered by some as social deviants. 
For these reasons, in light of the Price Waterhouse holding, transgendered, 
transsexual, and homosexual plaintiffs should be protected under the gender 
stereotyping rationale that the Supreme Court set forth, without any sort of 
“exceptions” that seem to have been created by inferior courts since this 
holding, in an effort to avoid broadening the scope of Title VII to their 
discomfort.  Using the rule, as it was stated in Price Waterhouse, allows for 
this logical extension that the Sixth Circuit permitted, broadening the scope of 
protection to those who have historically not been protected.  Despite the fact 
that homosexuals have not been accepted as a protected class under this same 
rationale, it is probably only a matter of time before they are in fact protected. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to justify a holding that a man discriminated 
against for not being masculine enough is protected, but an effeminate gay 
male or transgendered male is not protected simply because of his affection or 
sexual orientation.  Stereotyping related to traditional gender roles and societal 
norms of heterosexuality are interwoven and practically cannot be teased apart 
as they are not mutually exclusive ideas.  Granting protection to only some 
gender non-conformists, but not others, is not what Price Waterhouse 
anticipated or encouraged.  Rather, the Supreme Court set forth the rule that 
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discrimination based on traditional notions of gender roles and stereotypes is 
impermissible pursuant to Title VII.  The courts have complicated and 
confused this understanding by trying to make categorical exceptions that 
should not exist and were not intended to be part of the issue. 
COLLEEN C. KEANEY* 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University, 2007; B.A., Miami University of Ohio.  I would like to 
thank Matt Pistorius for all of his support, and Professor Nicole Porter, for her input on this 
Comment. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
606 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:581 
 
